The Routes Not Taken Page 30
Moses helped transit riders this time. He recommended the purchase of the Rockaway Beach branch to Mayor Impellitteri on May 16, 1951. The committee called for a bid of $7 million to the LIRR and the allocation of $40 million ($505 million in 2011 dollars) to convert it to a subway line. If the LIRR turned the offer down, they wanted the Interstate Commerce Commission and the New York State Public Service Commission to “compel” the railroad to put the line back into service. The last alternative was a city condemnation and takeover. The line would be linked with the Fulton Street El, and a second link to the Jamaica Avenue line, further to the north, would be considered, but was never built.
Not everyone supported this. George Wolpert of the Chamber of Commerce of the Rockaways wanted the line condemned in order to speed acquisition. A. Edward McDougall of the Queens Borough Chamber of Commerce wanted the line connected with the Queens Boulevard line despite the BOT’s concerns. Brooklyn Borough President John Cashmore wanted the Nostrand Avenue line extended and the Utica Avenue line built at the same time that work was being done on the Rockaway Beach line.38
An unexpected protest came from TWU President Michael J. Quill. Speaking to the State Congress of Industrial Organizations convention at Lake Placid on September 8, 1951, Quill called the purchase “the greatest steal since Boss Tweed.”39 Impellitteri delayed Board of Estimate action until Quill returned to outline his charges.
Impellitteri and Moses irately demanded that Quill explain himself. Moses called the accusation “a completely irresponsible blatherskite charge.… I do not propose to be slandered or libeled by you.” Moses went on to state, “… The recommendations of this committee were made solely in the public interest in order promptly to restore service in the Rockaways.”40
Quill and his counsel, John F. O’Donnell, testified on September 13, admitting that there was no evidence of illegal action. Quill believed the responsibility for adequate service to the Rockaways rested with Governor Dewey, the LIRR, and the state government, rather than the BOT. He also thought real estate and banking interests stood to benefit the most by a BOT takeover.41 O’Donnell repeated these charges. As an alternative, Quill and O’Donnell proposed extending the Nostrand Avenue line to the Rockaways. Bingham said this wasn’t financially feasible.42 The Board of Estimate unanimously approved the offer to the LIRR and endorsed the entire capital plan. They also approved resolutions calling for studies of extending the rapid transit system to Staten Island and the Throggs Neck and Ferry Point sections of the Bronx.
The BOT’s 1951 capital priority plan was used to win support for the $500 million debt limit exemption that would be voted on as a state constitutional amendment that November. Most of the projects on this were centered on the 2nd Avenue line. The amendment easily won victory in a referendum on November 6, receiving ninety-three thousand votes more than the amendment authorizing the sale of bonds to finance the construction of the New York State Thruway.
Despite the bond issue’s passage, the financial status of New York City and the BOT was tenuous. The city and state governments were considering the feasibility of an independent agency that would be responsible for its own financing to replace the Board as operator of the transit system, leading to the creation of the New York City Transit Authority.
Governor Dewey and the Republican leadership in the state legislature wanted to create the TA as part of a package to balance the city’s budget that also included the establishment of a 3 percent city sales tax, an increase in real estate taxes, the deferment of the city’s payment to the Teachers’ Pension Fund, and the authorization of a new series of “nuisance taxes” in the city. There was discussion of a new fare increase. Mayor Impellitteri and the Board of Estimate called for the imposition of new real estate taxes, an increase of state financial aid, and a takeover of the transit system by one of the agencies Robert Moses chaired, the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority.43
There was criticism of both plans. Assembly Minority Leader Irwin Steingut (his son, Stanley, was later Assembly speaker) said his members supported the TA’s creation but opposed a fare increase. Moses said the TBTA completely opposed taking over the transit systems: “The suggested expansion of the functions of this authority is unsound and … other, more practical means must be found to solve the city’s present financial problems.”44
The BOT released its final capital plan in July 1952. It called for the latest iteration of the 2nd Avenue line and the Utica and Nostrand Avenue lines. The Board of Estimate voted to approve the purchase of the Rockaway Beach line on May 22, 1952. In order to help to pay the cost of the purchase and for some capital work, they voted to charge a second fare for riding the subway south of the Howard Beach station. This surcharge stayed in effect into the 1970s, to the great annoyance of Rockaway residents.
Brooklyn Borough President Cashmore questioned the Rockaway Beach line purchase, fearing that the projects benefiting his borough would get lost in the shuffle, but voted for the purchase plan after receiving assurances from Impellitteri and the BOT that this wouldn’t happen. The BOT took steps to back up that assurance in the capital program. The expansion of the BMT’s DeKalb Avenue station and the rebuilding of the track and switches systems to the north and south of there, meant to be a component of the 2nd Avenue line, took top priority in the plan.
The CPC’s plan for the 1953 capital budget didn’t include the 2nd Avenue, Nostrand Avenue, or Utica Avenue projects. Despite Impellitteri’s support, the CPC didn’t recommend any commitment be made until the city’s financial needs had been resolved, but the city’s transit needs grew. With the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad facing severe operating deficits for the Staten Island Rapid Transit, the city took the first steps to take over the SIRT’s Tottenville Branch. The SIRT’s North Shore and South Beach branches were eliminated and replaced by bus lines.45 Later that month, Impellitteri formally proposed the creation of the TA, which would be financed by a new business tax and increased real estate taxes along with fare collection.46
The city’s financial status worsened in March 1953. Governor Dewey sent his own plan to create the TA to the state legislature on March 12, noting that the TA could resolve the transit system’s debts through the institution of “drastic economies” and the sale of the BOT’s bus lines to private operators. The Board of Estimate called for the implementation of Mayor Impellitteri’s plan, but Dewey called this action “self-defeating.”47 He would support only increased real estate taxes.
The TA Board would consist of five part-time members. The governor would name two, the mayor would name two, and the fifth would be appointed by a vote of the other four members. The Board of Estimate protested. They looked at imposing service cuts and layoffs as an alternative. Dewey responded by asking the state legislature to withhold new taxing powers from the city. Impellitteri had no alternative.48 He and the Democratic leaders in the legislature could only protest.
Dewey signed the legislation into law on March 26, criticizing the city for not coming up with a “workable” program: “The difference between the city administration and the state government on this issue is that the city would advocate hidden taxes and living on borrowed money and I consider such a program deeply damaging to the city, both financially and morally. The people are entitled to good government, and they are entitled to know its cost right out in public.”49 Major General Hugh J. Casey, a former army engineer with a distinguished war record, would be chairman.50 Bingham became the TA’s general manager.
The Board of Estimate voted to lease the transit system to the New York City Transit Authority on June 1, 1953. Comptroller Joseph, while supporting the lease, accused the governor and the legislature of using tactics “which violate the fundamental spirit of home rule. Manhattan Borough President Wagner voted against the lease along with City Council President Rudolph Halley because he believed it would result in a fare increase: “I would be against a higher fare if I were a plain businessman, employe [sic] or taxpayer because it is bad for the ci
ty.”51
Figure 10-2. Major General Hugh J. Casey.
The TA Board allocated funding for the rebuilding of the two bridges the Rockaway Beach line used to cross Jamaica Bay. Other budget items reflected the existing system’s need for upgrading. Funds were sought for new subway cars, modernized power plants, and lengthened subway platforms.
Casey announced a new capital plan. It was pretty much the same as the BOT’s with one major difference: one line that had been part of the Board’s plans since 1929 was missing. The Utica Avenue line, too expensive at $63 million ($730 million in 2011 dollars), especially with the emphasis on the Rockaway line, was gone,52 not to be proposed again until 1968. Contrary to past thinking, the TA felt that the Nostrand Avenue line and its proposed extension would be close enough for many Utica Avenue line riders. Budgeted at $38 million ($441 million in 2011 dollars), it remained a priority.
The TA Board voted to increase the subway and bus fare to fifteen cents in July. Impellitteri protested, saying it was “a hasty action taken without the benefit of mature consideration.” Halley, the Liberal Party’s candidate for mayor, said it was the “bitter harvest resulting from eight years of incompetence in city government.” Bronx Borough President Lyons thought better management and improved economic policy could save the fare. Casey replied that the fare increase was needed to operate the transit system on a self-sustaining basis and undertake deferred maintenance projects.53 TA workers made changes in station equipment, adjusting turnstiles in the subway system to handle a new form of paying the fare—tokens. (Nickels and dimes were previously used to insert in the turnstiles; tickets were bought and deposited before that.)
The state’s role in the operation of the transit system chafed at them much in the same way the Transit Commission did at the Hylan, Walker, and La Guardia administrations. Comptroller Joseph said the fare increase was “another example of state domination over city affairs.”54
The relationship between City Hall and the TA didn’t improve after Borough President Wagner defeated Mayor Impellitteri in the Democratic primary and then became mayor in November 1953. Wagner criticized the TA Board for not putting in enough time on the job, reducing service, and not cooperating with him: “The only means we have of getting information from the TA is through the newspapers.”55
The TA’s 1954 capital plan gave highest priority to completing the Rockaway line project and improving existing lines. Casey told the Board of Estimate that these projects were eating into the money provided by the 1951 bond issue. Additional funding was needed to build the 2nd Avenue line. The TA still wanted to build that line, but gave no indication as to when work would begin, despite hopes for a 1957 start.
The Northeast Bronx still waited for direct subway service to Manhattan. Bingham announced in December 1954 that the opening of the White Plains Road / Dyre Avenue connection was delayed. The new trains hadn’t yet been delivered. In any event, he felt that ridership on the Dyre Avenue line “doesn’t quite warrant it yet to be anything other than a shuttle.”56
Council Member Edward Vogel got part of what he wanted on October 30, 1954, when the Smith Street–Culver line connection was put into service. The part of the Culver line that connected with the West End line would operate as a shuttle until May 11, 1975.
The relationship between City Hall and the TA Board changed with the 1954 gubernatorial elections. Governor Dewey didn’t run for a fourth term, and he was succeeded by W. Averill Harriman. In his campaign, Harriman had attacked both Dewey and the TA, and his election gave Mayor Wagner the opportunity to seek change. Michael J. Quill and the Transport Workers Union sought the dissolution of the TA, with control returning to a city-appointed administrator. Neither Harriman nor Wagner wanted that, but they were unhappy with the existing system and began to discuss changes. The new TA Board would have three full-time paid members, one appointed by the mayor, one by the governor, and a chairman appointed by the two members. Charles L. Patterson,57 a veteran railroad executive, was its first chairman.
The connection between the BMT’s 60th Street Tunnel and the IND’s Queens Boulevard line opened for customer service on December 1, 1955, giving the TA the ability to provide direct service between Queens and Manhattan on both the express and local tracks. The BOT hadn’t seen the need for this when the first phase of the IND was built, which was a serious mistake.
The BOT’s decision to connect the local tracks only with the Brooklyn–Queens Crosstown line responded to Brooklyn Borough President Guider’s thinking that a huge demand for direct service between both boroughs existed.58 It wasn’t a need then; the Board realized that when the full line opened in 1937. We know that because the Board began both to plan for a new river crossing connecting with the Queens Boulevard line and to do more with the Crosstown line. A 6th Avenue line extension from West 53rd Street to Steinway Street and Broadway in Queens, connecting with the local tracks, was proposed in 1938.59 A new Crosstown line branch was proposed, running from Long Island City to Marathon Parkway in Douglaston via 21st Street, Ditmars Boulevard, Astoria Boulevard, 104th Street, Corona Avenue, and Horace Harding Boulevard.
This was the first in a series of proposals the BOT and the TA made for new crossings between Manhattan and Queens linking with a route paralleling the Queens Boulevard line. In Manhattan, the line would connect with either the 6th Avenue or Broadway lines; the eastern terminal would range from northeastern Queens to the Rockaway Peninsula. The Queens Boulevard–60th Street tunnel connection, about 3,700 feet in length, first proposed in 1940, was a short-term action to be in service while the river tunnel and cross-borough line were built.
The BOT and TA proposed adding a branch line to their proposals for the 2nd Avenue line in the 1950s, running from East 76th Street, connecting with the Rockaway Beach line in Rego Park. Both agencies had realized Queens was developing with a population surge that the Queens Boulevard and Flushing lines couldn’t accommodate. Another line was needed.
Patterson talked about what the impact of that new line would be shortly before the Queens Boulevard–60th Street tunnel connection opened: “The authority believes that the new operation can change the pattern of passenger traffic flow in midtown Manhattan and, by substantially altering travel habits by many thousands of riders, can better distribute these passengers over various lines.”60
On July 29, 1956, Patterson discussed his view of long-range action on the Viewpoint program on WRCA-TV.61 He didn’t talk about the 2nd, Utica, or Nostrand Avenue lines, but rather about how the Queens Boulevard line was operating at capacity and how the borough was growing.
The plan that Patterson outlined was for a $2 billion ($20.5 billion in 2011 dollars) trunk line across Queens, possibly integrating it with the LIRR. He didn’t discuss the specifics of the route, but did say it would run along the 2nd Avenue line to East 74th Street in Manhattan and under the East River to Queens. It would run north of the Queens Boulevard line to White Pot Junction in Rego Park, the point where the Rockaway Beach line broke away from the LIRR’s main line. Patterson spoke of the subway line operating to St. Albans in southeastern Queens and Little Neck in northeastern Queens. He knew this couldn’t be done right away. The plan itself would take another year to complete and it would take ten years to put the line into service.62
Figure 10-3. Mayor Robert F. Wagner, Jr., and Transit Authority Chairman Charles L. Patterson at a City Hall event. (Photo courtesy of the New York Transit Museum Archives)
During the broadcast, Patterson was asked about what happened to the $500 million from the bonds that had been authorized for sale in 1951. “If most of that money had not been allocated for rehabilitating the existing systems and modernizing old power plants there would have been a complete breakdown of rapid transit in the city,” he answered.63 A new bond issue would be needed for the plan.
Brooklyn exploded. The Brooklyn Civic Council told the borough’s legislators that it was “unthinkable” that the Queens line should be built before work began
on the Utica and Nostrand Avenue lines, and called on the legislators to oppose Patterson’s proposal.64 Borough President Cashmore, saying the TA acted like “a prince in Manhattan and a pauper in Brooklyn,” vowed he wouldn’t support “any transit improvements that did not include Brooklyn.” State Senator William Rosenblatt made the same promise on behalf of Brooklyn’s state legislators.65
Ringing endorsements weren’t coming from Queens. “The plan is fine, but it started 10 years too late. We’ve been fighting for a plan similar to that for 10 years and we should have had it in operation by now,” said Queens Transit Committee Chairman Simeon Heller. “And now the TA wants to spend two billion dollars to complete work that should have been done years ago,” said Dr. J. Simeon Smith of the Richmond Hill Taxpayers Association. “Let’s get it out of ‘dreamland’ and get working on it now. We in East Queens need rapid transit as fast as we can get it,” said Giovanni Nisita of the East Queens Civic Council.66
Patterson tried to walk everything back. It was a “misunderstanding”; reactions to his comments were a “tempest in a teapot.” There was no specific plan for Queens—certainly nothing beyond what was planned for 2nd Avenue.67 Patterson also pointed out that new subway lines in Brooklyn were not dead issues, but that putting the existing system into a state of good repair took precedence.68 Nothing more was done, but the concept Patterson discussed would be brought up again. This was the first step toward lines that would be proposed throughout the 1960s.
The need for the existing system’s rehabilitation increased, using up what was left of the 1951 bond issue funds. The only funding for a new line besides the Chrystie Street / DeKalb Avenue project was $500,000 ($4 million in 2011 dollars) for a new engineering study for the Nostrand Avenue line. Cashmore viewed that alone as being “a great victory for Brooklyn.”69