The Routes Not Taken Read online

  The effect of the priority given to maintaining the transit system’s fare structure cannot be minimized. Even in an era when funding sources were limited, Hylan made maintaining the five-cent fare a key talking point of his administration and campaigns.

  In a series of campaign appearances shortly before the 1921 election, Hylan spoke about his views on the fare and the IRT and BRT:

  The City of New York has invested a quarter of a billion dollars in creating the finest rapid transit system in the world. It was not a private enterprise in its inception, execution or development. It was an experiment in municipal ownership, conceived by the city, built by the city and paid for by the city. The city owns this rapid transit system, but has leased it to [subway] companies to operate under a guarantee that adequate service will be provided for forty-nine years at a 5-cent fare.

  I have opposed an increased fare on the rapid transit lines because the contract between the private operators and the city forbids it and also because our investigation of the companies proves that there is no need or justification for such an increase of fare.

  An increase in fares of three cents a passenger would amount to $180,000 daily or $60,000,000 [$754 million in 2011, according to MeasuringWorth.com] yearly. Such an increase would be a hardship to thousands of our citizens already sorely pressed to meet their daily living expenses.

  The private owners of the [subway] lines want to juggle the receipts and assets of the city-owned rapid transit system so as to restore and perpetuate their enormous private profits. They never have given the people decent and adequate service as long as they have been in control; but they have squandered millions of dollars in excessive dividends, wasteful bonuses, buying useless charters and bolstering up bankrupt milked-dry transit lines.

  I have no desire to dwell upon the sins of the traction rings [subway operators] of the past, but as long as I am Mayor of New York present and future fare-payers, taxpayers, and the honest investing public shall not suffer by a repetition of such misdeeds.7

  His campaign attempted to place advertising in BRT stations that read, “You ride on this train for 5 cents because Hylan is Mayor.” The BRT’s advertising contractor, the Home Boroughs Car Advertising Company (whose president was none other than Joseph P. Day), refused to accept the ads, claiming that they were “offensive to good taste”; his campaign manager—John H. Delaney—took the matter to court.8

  As the chairman of the Board of Transportation, Delaney shied away from a fare increase. Mayors Walker and La Guardia would not take that step and give the Board of Transportation cover. It was not until the administration of William O’Dwyer, who recognized the need to upgrade and expand the subway system, that there was a mayor in office who would support a fare increase and BOT chairpersons (Charles Gross and William Reid) who addressed the subject. It may have been too late by then.

  The IND served the city well. Despite John Hylan’s ambitions, it was never a financial success. The city needed to appropriate funding to make up the deficit. Garrett wrote that “the city, in effect, undertook to subsidize the five-cent fare; this policy, not only added to the real estate tax load, but served to limit the city’s ability to borrow under its debt limit and consequently its construction of new capital projects.”9

  It was hoped that the unification of the subway system, when achieved in July 1940, would lower costs and facilitate the system’s expansion. That didn’t happen. The start of World War II had the same impact on costs that World War I did. “With the five-cent fare the hope of a balanced budget other than by windfalls and expedients was vain; yet the longer the fare remained fixed the more difficult it was to change it,” August Heckscher and Phyllis Robinson wrote in their history of the La Guardia administration, When La Guardia Was Mayor. “To this dead end had come the large hopes evoked by municipal ownership of the city’s public transportation system.”10

  Heckscher and Robinson noted that Mayor La Guardia was in the same position as everyone else on the matter of the fare. In his 1944 budget message, La Guardia “asserted that there was no individual in any party, and no legislative body, that would take the first step in raising the fare. He proved to be right and he seemed to feel no embarrassment in including himself.”11 La Guardia left office at the end of 1945 without doing much to increase the funding of the transit system, through either instituting fare increases or finding new sources of funding. In his time in office, William O’Dwyer seemed ready to change that mind-set, but other concerns took precedence.

  The expansion projects that were “shovel ready,” in modern parlance—the remainder of the IND’s first phase, the Dyre Avenue line, the Culver line, and other ongoing projects—needed to be completed. The existing system’s infrastructure needed upgrading. New subway cars and buses had to be purchased and the Rockaway Beach branch of the LIRR would need to be purchased and integrated into the subway system. Debt service had to be paid and labor costs rose. Instead of paying for new lines, the fare increase that O’Dwyer supported and the funds from the 1951 bond issue, out of necessity, had to address those concerns. Six years later, Charles Patterson would point out how unrealistic the plans for making use of the funds from that bond issue were.

  The immediate needs of the transit system grew in the 1950s, while less concern appears to have been given to meeting them. Not until late in Robert F. Wagner’s third term in office did it seem that City Hall wanted to play a role in expanding the transit system. Indeed, it appears that once Wagner regained a degree of local control of the system in 1955, he was content to let Charles L. Patterson be the only real advocate for growth. Patterson couldn’t do much without substantial support from the mayor’s office. The 1951 bond issue funds dwindled away without much thought as to substantial next steps.

  John V. Lindsay’s administration had the desire to expand the transit system, but it was at a time when control was again being returned to the New York State government with the creation of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority. The MTA’s first effort to expand the rail network, the “New Routes” plan, collided with the fiscal realities of the 1970s and the need to repair an existing system that had been starved by years of deferred maintenance. Subsequent mayors and governors were shackled by those realities.

  Much of the capital funding expended in the years following the Archer Avenue and 63rd Street lines and a one-stop extension of the Lenox Avenue line have gone to catching up. The existing system needed to be upgraded and modernized. It took almost eight decades for city officials to realize that people with disabilities needed access to subways and buses.

  New routes had to sit and wait for a time when the leadership of the New York City and New York State governments and the governing transit agencies had the vision and incentive to move ahead and build. As with the 2nd Avenue subway, it has happened, but only in increments.

  Even in a time of lowered economic expectations, what happens to the subway system now that the completion of the 2nd Avenue line’s first phase and the No. 7 line’s westward extension are within sight?

  Three more sections of the 2nd Avenue line are waiting to be built in Manhattan. A further extension of the 7 line, this time to New Jersey, has been under discussion, as is the reactivation of the remainder of the Rockaway Beach line and the Staten Island Railway’s North Shore branch. Someone may yet make a new proposal to build the Narrows Tunnel, extend the Concourse line to the Northeast Bronx, or construct the Utica Avenue line. The rapid transit needs of northeastern, eastern, or southeastern Queens may finally be addressed.

  Will it happen? If there is a new generation of planners like Daniel Lawrence Turner, Henry M. Brinckerhoff, or William Barclay Parsons who have the vision to see the region as a whole and how the rail network needs to grow to meet its needs, then yes, it could happen. If there are elected officials like John Purroy Mitchel or George A. McAneny who share that vision, and if the voting public is willing to support the attainment of those goals, then it is even more likely. Whether t
hat is the case, however, remains to be seen.

  Appendixes

  Appendix A: The 1944 Service Plan

  On August 9, 1944, Board of Transportation General Superintendent Philip E. Pheifer sent a memorandum titled Service to Be Operated When the Second Avenue Line Is Constructed. It recommended the IND / BMT service plan for when that line was operating and the DeKalb Avenue switches were rebuilt.

  IND / BMT CONNECTIONS

  • Fourteen trains per hour from the Jamaica Avenue line to the Queens Boulevard line, via the Williamsburg Bridge, Chrystie Street, and the 8th Avenue line.

  • Ten trains per hour from the Sea Beach line to Washington Heights via the Manhattan Bridge, Chrystie Street, and the 6th and 8th Avenue lines.

  BMT / 2ND AVENUE LINE CONNECTIONS

  • Ten local trains per hour from the West End line to 72nd Street via the Montague Street Tunnel, Nassau Street, Chrystie Street, and 2nd Avenue.

  • Eight local trains per hour from the 4th Avenue line to a northern terminal via the Manhattan Bridge, Chrystie Street, and 2nd Avenue.

  • Eight local trains per hour from the Brighton Beach line to a northern terminal via the Manhattan Bridge, Chrystie Street, and 2nd Avenue.

  2ND AVENUE LINE TRAINS

  • Ten express trains per hour from a northern terminal to Chambers Street on the Nassau Street line.

  • Ten express trains per hour from a northern terminal to Broad Street on the Nassau Street line.

  • Ten express trains per hour from a northern terminal to Bergen Street on the Smith Street line via 2nd Avenue, 57th Street, 6th Avenue, and Houston and Smith Streets.

  OTHER LINES

  IND

  BMT

  D Line (Concourse express)—Bronx to Church Avenue or Coney Island

  Ten Sea Beach express trains—Coney Island to Times Square

  Concourse local—Bedford Park Boulevard to Hudson Terminal

  Twelve West End express trains—Bay Parkway to Times Square

  F line—Parsons Boulevard to Hudson Terminal

  Ten Brighton Beach express trains—Brighton Beach to Times Square

  A line—207th Street to Rockaway Avenue

  Ten 4th Avenue local trains—95th Street to Queens Plaza

  Brooklyn / Queens Crosstown line—71st Avenue to Smith–9th Street

  Twelve Brighton Beach local trains—Coney Island to Queens Plaza

  Eight Myrtle Avenue line trains—Metropolitan Avenue to Broad Street

  Eight Broadway short line trains—Rockaway Parkway to Chambers Street

  Appendix B: The 1947 2nd Avenue Service Plan

  On December 16, 1947, the Board of Transportation released the following list showing how existing subway lines would change once the 2nd Avenue Trunk Line was built.1 These lines would use the Chrystie Street connection and other planned links.

  From

  To

  Via

  Washington Heights2

  207th Street

  Lefferts Boulevard

  8th Avenue / Fulton Street

  168th Street

  Jamaica

  6th Avenue / Broadway–Brooklyn / Jamaica Avenue

  Concourse3

  205th Street

  Brighton Beach

  6th Avenue / Brighton

  Bedford Park Boulevard

  Hudson Terminal

  8th Avenue

  Pelham Bay Park4

  Pelham Bay Park

  Hudson Terminal

  2nd Avenue / 57th Street / 6th Avenue

  Coney Island

  2nd Avenue / Montague Street Tunnel / West End

  Fort Hamilton

  2nd Avenue / Montague Street Tunnel / 4th Avenue

  Grand Street

  2nd Avenue

  Queens Boulevard5

  179th Street

  Lefferts Boulevard

  8th Avenue / Fulton Street

  Coney Island

  6th Avenue / Culver

  Forest Hills

  Broadway / Brighton

  City Hall

  Broadway

  Church Avenue

  Brooklyn–Queens Crosstown

  Fort Hamilton6

  95th Street

  57th Street

  4th Avenue / Manhattan Bridge / Broadway

  Astoria

  4th Avenue / Montague Tunnel / Broadway

  Pelham Bay Park

  4th Avenue / 2nd Avenue / Pelham

  Sea Beach7

  Coney Island

  57th Street

  Manhattan Bridge / Broadway

  149th Street

  Manhattan Bridge / 2nd Avenue

  West End8

  Coney Island

  Pelham Bay Park

  2nd Avenue / Montague Street Tunnel

  57th Street

  Manhattan Bridge / Broadway

  Culver9

  Coney Island

  179th Street

  6th Avenue / Queens Boulevard

  Brighton Beach10

  Brighton Beach

  205th Street

  8th Avenue / Concourse

  Coney Island

  149th Street

  Manhattan Bridge / 2nd Avenue

  Forest Hills

  Broadway / Queens Boulevard

  Canarsie11

  Rockaway Parkway

  8th Avenue

  14th Street–Canarsie

  Chambers Street

  14th Street–Canarsie / Broadway–Brooklyn

  Fulton Street12

  Lefferts Boulevard

  207th Street

  8th Avenue

  179th Street

  8th Avenue / Queens Boulevard

  Euclid Avenue

  Court Street

  Fulton Street

  Jamaica Avenue13

  168th Street–Jamaica

  168th Street–Manhattan

  8th Avenue

  8th Avenue

  14th Street–Canarsie

  White Plains Road14

  East 241st Street

  New Lots Avenue

  Lexington Avenue

  Flatbush Avenue

  Broadway–7th Avenue

  Appendix C: The Cast of Characters

  Most New York City subway lines have had a range of route designations, using letters and numbers. The IND lines have always had letter designations. The BMT lines were numbered, though they switched over to letters as they were merged with the IND from the 1950s into the 1960s (e.g., the Brighton line was the No. 1 line; since the changeover, the B, D, Q, QB, QJ, and QT lines have operated along its tracks). IRT lines were known by their name only until number designation began to be introduced in the 1940s. Even so, this system did not fully take hold until the 1960s. Line names were the primary form of designation on subway maps until then.

  Several lines never had letter or number designations. The 2nd, 6th, and 9th Avenue Els were just known by name; the only part of the 3rd Avenue El that had a number designation was the line segment in the Bronx that survived the demolition in the 1950s, which was known as the No. 8 line. Several letter designations are no longer used, such as the HH, K, RJ, NX, T, TT, and W lines, along with the No. 9; others, such as the P, will probably never be used.

  It was for that reason that I avoided using letter and number designations except for the chapter on the Flushing line. However, just to give you an idea of what now runs there, I’ve prepared the chart below.

  Line

  Primarily served by in 2013

  Archer Avenue line

  E, J, Z

  Astoria line

  N, Q1

  Brighton Beach line

  B, Q

  Broadway line

  N, Q, R